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 First version received March 1988; final version accepted February 1990 (eds.)
 As was shown by Dewatripont, optimal long-term contracts under asymmetric information
 are generally not time-consistent. This paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a two-period
 procurement model with commitment and renegotiation. It also analyzes whether renegotiated
 long-term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unrenegotiated long-term
 contracts or a sequence of short-term contracts, and links the analysis with the multiple unit
 durable good monopoly problem.
 1. INTRODUCTION
 The optimal way to organize long-term relationships is, if feasible, to write long-term
 contracts to which all parties are committed. Commitment prevents these parties from
 behaving opportunistically ex post and thus promotes efficient conduct ex ante. Yet full
 commitment is an idealized case. The corresponding optimal contracts are generally not
 sequentially optimal or renegotiation-proof. That is, in the process of implementing a
 long-term contract, all parties may be better off modifying the initial contract (while this
 renegotiation is ex post mutually beneficial, the parties would ex ante like to be able to
 commit not to renegotiate). The commitment modelling so common in economic theory
 at best describes an extreme case in which the physical costs of recontracting are important
 or in which one of the parties can develop a reputation for refraining from signing
 mutually advantageous contracts.
 This paper investigates the implications of renegotiation in an adverse selection
 model.1 Section 2 sets up a simple two-period model of procurement (as discussed below,
 the model admits alternative interpretations, such as two-period monopoly price or quality
 discrimination). In each period, the agent realizes a project for the principal. The project's
 cost in that period depends on a time-invariant adverse selection parameter or type (the
 agent's ability or the state of technology) and on a cost-reducing effort. The only commonly
 observable variable is the realized cost in the period. In a static (one-period) framework,
 1. See Fudenberg-Tirole (1988) for a study of renegotiation in a moral-hazard framework, and Hart and
 Moore (1988), Green and Laffont (1987)(1988) for the case of symmetric but nonverifiable information. These
 papers as well as the present work use a principal-agent framework (i.e. concern renegotiation in contract
 theory). For the study of non-contractual renegotiation in game-theoretic contexts see in particular Pearce
 (1987) and Farrell and Maskin (1987).
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 598 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
 the optimal incentive scheme for the principal trades off the two conflicting concerns of
 extracting the agent's informational rent and giving the latter appropriate incentives to
 reduce cost, and specifies a reward that decreases with realized cost. With two types (the
 case considered in most of this paper), the incentive constraint is binding "upwards"
 only. The issue is to induce the good (efficient) type not to mimic the bad (inefficient)
 type. For the optimal incentive scheme under asymmetric information, the good type
 produces at his socially optimal cost while the bad type's cost exceeds his socially optimal
 cost in order to reduce the good type's rent.
 In the twice-repeated relationship, the principal would optimally commit to repeat
 twice the optimal static scheme. That is, he ought to commit not to alter the first-period
 incentive scheme in the second period. However, this optimal commitment incentive
 scheme is not renegotiation proof (Dewatripont (1986)). For, suppose that the agent has
 produced at the high cost in the first period, demonstrating that he has low ability or
 that the technology is unfavourable. While the initial contract induces the same
 inefficiently high cost in the second period, it has become common knowledge that this
 contract can be renegotiated to benefit both parties by giving more incentives to the agent.
 But this renegotiation with the bad type towards higher incentives raises the rent of the
 good type, if the latter masquerades as a bad type in the first period. It thus makes the
 good type's incentive compatibility constraint in the first period harder to satisfy.
 In Laffont-Tirole (1987, 1988) we investigated a two-period model of a principal-agent
 relationship run by short-term contracts. That is, we assumed that the principal can only
 commit to one-period incentive schemes.2 In the second period the principal selects his
 preferred contract conditional on the information learned in the first period. Such
 short-term contracts are trivially renegotiation-proof. A main focus of this analysis was
 the ratchet effect: the fact that the agent is concerned about the expropriation of his
 informational rent in the second period makes separation of types costly, and even
 infeasible in the case of a continuum of types. The intuition for this latter result is that,
 given that no rent is left for period two if the agent reveals his type in period one,
 disguising slightly his type in period one has no first-order effect (from the envelope
 theorem) but yields a first-order gain in rent for period two.
 The analysis of short-term contracting is complex because a bad type may adopt the
 "take-the-money-and-run" strategy: to induce a good type to reveal some information in
 the first period, the first-period contract must offer him a nice deal, which may make it
 optimal for a bad type to mimic a good type in the first period and quit the relationship
 in the second period. Thus the first-period incentive constraints may be binding upwards
 and downwards.
 In this paper we make an assumption about commitment abilities of the parties
 intermediate between full intertemporal commitment and no intertemporal commitment,
 which we refer to as "commitment and renegotiation". We allow commitment in that the
 two parties sign a long-term contract that is enforced if any of the parties wants it to be
 enforced. However nothing prevents the parties from agreeing to alter the initial contract.
 While the optimal contract can w.l.o.g. be designed so as not to be renegotiated in the
 second period, the renegotiation-proofness (RP) requirement restricts the set of allowable
 second-period contracts. The analysis shares with the commitment case the simplicity
 associated with the incentive constraint being binding upwards only, and yet exhibits a
 form of ratcheting similar to that of the no-commitment case. The ability to commit
 2. See Freixas et al. (1985) for an earlier game-theoretic approach to the ratchet effect (which restricted
 attention to linear incentive schemes), and Baron-Besanko (1987) for a different notion of no-commitment (in
 which the principal is constrained to be "fair" to the agent in period two).
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 eliminates the possibility of the take-the-money-and-run strategy by making all payments
 conditional on the firm's participation in period two.
 Section 3 demonstrates that there are three kinds of renegotiation-proof contracts.
 In all kinds, the good type produces at his socially optimal cost level. In the first kind,
 the second-period allocation is that of a "sell-out" or "fixed-price" contract; that is, the
 agent, whatever his type, behaves as if he were residual claimant for his cost savings and
 produces at his (type-contingent) socially optimal cost. The second kind is the "condi-
 tionally optimal contract." That is, the agent faces the same incentive contract he would
 face if the principal were not bound by a previous contract and offered the optimal static
 contract given his posterior beliefs about the agent's type. The third kind is the intermediate
 class of "rent-constrained contracts", in which the bad agent produces at a cost that lies
 between his socially optimal cost and his cost in the optimal static contract given the
 principal's posterior beliefs (the conditionally optimal contract is thus an extreme rent-
 constrained contract). The principal would like to increase the bad type's cost to reduce
 the good type's rent, but is unable to do so because of the rent level he previously offered
 the good type.
 Section 4 characterizes the optimal intertemporal contract. The second-period con-
 tract is conditionally optimal (i.e. is of the second kind). In the first period, only the
 good type's incentive compatibility constraint is binding (as in the unrenegotiated contract
 case, but unlike the no-commitment case). The good type is indifferent between revealing
 his type and masquerading as a bad type. The description of the optimal contracts is
 therefore rather simple. Incentive constraints are binding as usual and the contracts
 offered in period two are conditionally optimal, i.e. are not distorted by the principal's
 ability to commit to rents. However, none of these results is obvious. Limits on
 commitment might, as in Laffont-Tirole (1987), lead to incentive constraints binding in
 both directions. And the ability to commit to rents to mitigate the first-period incentive
 constraints might lead to distortions in second-period contracts away from conditionally
 optimal contracts.
 The equilibrium is a separating one only if the discount factor is small (Section 5).
 The equilibrium probability that the good type pools with the bad type increases with
 the discount factor and converges to one (without ever reaching this value) when the
 parties become very patient.
 Section 6 analyses the case of a continuum of types. It shows that fully separating
 the types is feasible but never optimal for the principal.
 Our work has general implications for adverse selection models. In particular, we
 ask if the Hart-Tirole (1988) result according to which the optimal long-term contract
 between a buyer and a seller yields, for unit demand, the same outcome as Coase's
 non-commitment durable good model holds when consumption is a continuous variable.
 The answer is positive if and only if the discount factor is not too high. As a by-product,
 we compute the multiple-unit two-period monopoly price discriminating allocation (Sec-
 tion 7).
 The conclusion (Section 8) contains a fairly extensive comparison of the findings
 with those for the same model when the relationship is organised by a sequence of short
 term contracts (Laffont-Tirole (1987,1988)). We discuss whether the outcome under
 commitment and renegotiation is intermediate between those under full commitment and
 under no commitment.
 The paper does not make predictions as to whether contract renegotiation is likely
 to be observed. The renegotiation-proofness principle asserts that the principal can restrict
 attention to contracts that are not renegotiated. On the other hand, the paper shows that
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 an alternative optimal scheme for the principal is to offer a menu of two contracts in
 period one, that is renegotiated with some probability: a long-term, fixed-price contract
 (which is not renegotiated), and a short-term contract.
 It is often asserted in the procurement context that high-powered incentive schemes
 (such as a fixed-price contract) are impractical because they are likely to be renegotiated.
 Such conventional wisdom should be viewed with caution. High-powered incentive
 schemes yield efficient production and thus are less subject to renegotiation than low-
 powered ones, which are meant to limit the firm's rent. Indeed, comparing commitment
 to commitment and renegotiation, the threat of renegotiation induces more powerful
 incentive schemes in the second period! (The effects of renegotiation on the first period
 are more ambiguous. The good type's incentives go down while the bad type's go up.)
 If the conventional wisdom has any merits, these must stem from reasons not captured
 by our modelling, such as ex post cost uncertainty combined with bankruptcy or political
 inability for the regulator to commit even to the original contract.
 2. THE MODEL
 (a) The commitment framework
 We consider a two-period model in which a firm (the agent) must, each period, realize
 a project with a cost structure:
 ct =8- et, t = 1, 2,
 where et is the level of effort exerted by the firm's manager in period t, and 13 is a
 parameter known only by the manager, which can take two values ,3 and 13, with 13>,3.
 Type 13 is called the "good type", and type 13 is the "bad type".
 Each period the manager's utility level is U s - 4'(e), where s is the net (i.e. in
 addition to cost) monetary transfer he receives from the regulator and +f(e) is his disutility
 of effort, where qf,(0) = 0, qf > 0, qif > 0, and, for technical reasons, i.".' 0.3 Let e* denote
 the socially optimal level of effort, defined by the equality between the marginal disutility
 of effort and the marginal cost savings:
 q'(e*) = 1.
 The socially optimal cost level is type-contingent and is equal to 3 - e*.
 The regulator (the principal) observes cost but not the effort level or the value of
 the parameter ,3. He has a prior about 13 characterized by v' = prob (13 =13). This
 probability is common knowledge.
 Let S be, each period, the social utility of the project, which can be viewed for
 simplicity as a public good, i.e. as not sold on the market. The gross payment made by
 the regulator to the firm is s + c. We assume that there is a distortionary cost A incurred
 to raise each unit of money (through excise taxes for example).4
 Consumers' welfare in period t is
 S -(1 + A)(st + ct)
 3. This assumption in particular ensures that the optimal incentive scheme under commitment is deter-
 ministic. More generally, our results would hold as long as i/"' is "not too negative".
 4. 1+A is the shadow price of public funds. It is exogenous in our analysis. It could be taken
 time-dependent as long as it is exogenous. It differs from the shadow price of a budget constraint in a Ramsey
 programme in that it is given by economy-wide data and is thus exogenous to the particular control problem
 studied here.
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 and let 8 be the firm's and the regulator's discount factor. Note that 8 may exceed 1
 because it reflects the relative lengths of the accounting periods or the relative importance
 of the first- and second-period projects.
 Under complete information, a utilitarian regulator would solve in each period t
 max{e,,s,} {S-(1 + Ak)(st + ,8-et ) + st-q iet )} subject to st- iet ) ? 0.
 The individual rationality constraint, st - qf(et) 0, says that the utility level of a
 firm's manager must be positive to obtain his participation (the complete information
 problem being stationary, the allocation is the same at each period).
 We assume that S is large enough so that the project is always desirable.
 The optimal regulatory allocation is then
 et=e* and st= q(e*), t=1,2.
 Welfare is
 (1 + 8)(S-(1 + A)(4,(e*) +13 -e*))
 Because the specific form of the principal's and agent's objective functions is not
 crucial for our results, from now on we use the general terminology "principal" and
 "agent" instead of "regulator" and "firm".
 We now derive the optimal static incentive scheme under incomplete information.
 As is well-known, (Roberts (1983), Baron and Besanko (1984)), the optimal two-period
 incentive scheme under full commitment is the twofold repetition of this optimal static
 scheme (see Appendix 1).
 From the revelation principle, any incentive scheme is equivalent to a revelation
 mechanism in which the agent truthfully announces his type and the principal imposes
 associated values for s and c. The mechanism can therefore be summarized by four
 numbers (sy, c) (when the agent announces 13) and (s, c) (when the agent announces 8).
 The principal faces four constraints: two individual rationality (IR) constraints, guarantee-
 ing that the two types get a non-negative utility in the relationship, and two incentive
 compatibility (IC) constraints, guaranteeing that the agent does not want to conceal his
 type. As is usual, only two of these constraints are binding: the bad type's IR constraint
 and the good type's IC constraint (that the other two constraints are indeed satisfied
 when they are ignored in the principal's optimization programme can be verified ex post).
 We thus impose:
 U=s-+(,X3-c) o, (2.1)
 and
 V = _s - +(,X - c ' - +(X3 - c), (2.2)
 where U and U denote the good and the bad type's utilities or rents. In the optimal
 contract, (2.1) and (2.2) are satisfied with equality:
 U = 0 (2.3)
 and
 U= _ + (W)= (W) (2.4)
 where ?(c) denotes the good type's rent and is determined by the bad type's cost level:
 ?(c) 4-(X3 - c) - 4(13 - c). (2.5)
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 Under our assumptions, 4) is a decreasing and convex function of c. That is, the good
 type's rent decreases with the bad type's cost, but at a decreasing rate. The principal
 maximizes his expected welfare. Replacing s by [ U + qi(e)] and (from now on) ignoring
 the constant surplus yields:
 Min Ep [(1+A)(fi (I3-c)+c)+AU]. (2.6)
 Note that welfare is expressed in terms of efficiency E[(1 + A )('(, - c) + c)] and rent
 E(A U). (The reasoning in this paper aimed at improving on a given contract will either
 increase efficiency keeping rent constant or possibly increase both efficiency and rent.)
 That is, the total cost for a given type is [qf(e)+c], which has shadow cost (1+A), to
 which must be added the shadow cost of the agent's rent. We thus solve:
 Min{c c} {z'j(1 + A)(4'(p -c)+?c) + A4(c)] +(1 - v)(1 + A)(+(p3-c) + c)} (I)
 The good type's cost is socially optimal:
 c = 8 - e* (2.7)
 However, the bad type's cost is inflated so as to reduce the good type's rent:
 ()= 1 + A(- v (e <1 (2.8)
 We let c(vl) denote the unique solution to equation (2.8). It is easily verified that
 c(z'l) exceeds the socially optimal cost W3- e* (unless z' = 0), and that it increases with zl'.
 Proposition 1. The optimal (static or dynamic) commitment solution is characterized
 by:
 c(vl) =X3 - e*,
 -(pi) >8 - -e*,
 -> 0 and U(vz) = O(M(PO)).
 dvl
 We implicitly assumed in the previous analysis that the probability of the bad type
 is not too small; for, above some cut-off level of zl, the principal would choose not to
 let the bad type produce at all. We will henceforth assume that 1- v' is sufficiently high
 so that the principal does not elect to ignore the bad type.5
 For further reference, we also derive the optimal pooling allocation. To this end,
 suppose that the principal is constrained to pick a single cost target c for both types (in
 the commitment case, the principal would never elect to do so; see Proposition 1; but
 this thought experiment will be useful later, as the solution under renegotiation may
 involve pooling in the first period). The principal pays a transfer equal to +f(X3 - c) so
 as to satisfy (2.1). The cost is thus [4'(1-c)+c], regardless of the agent's type. The
 good type's rent is ?(c). Hence the principal chooses c so as to solve
 Minfc} {(1 + A )E[(q(p-c) + c)] + Avk4(c)}
 ={(1 +A)[zl1(qf(P-c)+ c)+(1-vl)(qf(i-c)+ c)]+ Azk14(c)}. (2.9)
 5. The reader may be worried that no such assumption can be made in a dynamic model. Indeed the
 second-period beliefs v2 might be close to 1 even though the prior beliefs vP are not assumed not to. However,
 we will show that along the equilibrium path either v2 _ v1 (and then our assumption implies that both types
 should be kept) or v2 = 1 (and then only the good type is relevant). It can indeed be shown that for any v1
 under some cut-off level, the equilibrium is as described in this paper.
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 The solution of this strictly convex programme, cP( P,), lies between the two types' socially
 optimal costs:
 ,X3 - e* <cP(Pl) <,8 - e*,
 and decreases with the probability of the good type:
 dcP <0. (2.10)
 dvl
 (b) The renegotiation game
 We now assume that the parties can sign a long-term contract at date 1, but that the
 principal can at date 2 offer to renegotiate the initial contract. The principal puts prior
 beliefs PI on the agent's having the good type. The two parties are initially bound by the
 "null contract", which specifies no production and no transfer in either period. At the
 beginning of period 1, the principal offers a long-term contract {sJ(cl), sA(c1, c2)}.6 This
 contract is called a short-term contract if so is the (second-period) null contract. After
 observing the agent's performance cl, the principal updates his beliefs to P2 and offers
 a new second-period contract, that the agent accepts or refuses.7 At any stage, the parties
 abide by the contract in force if the agent rejects the new contract offer. The old contract
 is superseded by the new one if the agent accepts the latter. Last, one can restrict the
 contract offered in period 1 to be renegotiation-proof in period 2, since parties have
 rational expectations.
 3. RENEGOTIATION-PROOF SECOND-PERIOD CONTRACTS
 Suppose that, at the beginning of date two, beliefs are P2 =v. Two cases must be
 considered, depending on whether the principal wants to keep the bad type in period two.
 If the principal does not wish to keep the bad type, then a renegotiation-proof
 contract specifies the first-best cost of the good type 13 - e* and some level of rent U.
 If the principal wishes to keep the bad type, let U0 and U? be the second-period
 rents of the good and bad types (not including the foregone first-period transfer and
 disutility of effort) specified by the initial contract binding the parties.
 Without loss of generality, we assume that U? =0, by adjusting if necessary the
 first-period transfers (the reader can check that the analysis below is unaffected if we
 choose a different normalization).
 6. Equivalently, in the two-type case, a long-term contract is the offer of two incentive schemes, A and B,
 between which the agent selects. Both A and B are of the form {(cl, s,); (C2, ?2), (C-2, S2)}. That is the agent
 chooses (cl, s,) in period one and then announces his type in period two to pick either (?92, s2) or (c2, s2).
 Lemma 1 below shows that there is no gain in having the agent reveal more information in period one than is
 necessary to determine the first-period allocation (that is, if A and B specified the same (cl, s,) and differed
 in some first-period announcement by the agent, A and B could be merged in a single incentive scheme at no
 loss for the principal); and that there is no gain in introducing more than two incentive schemes.
 7. Note that we model renegotiation with the uninformed party making the offer. The analysis is more
 complex if the informed party (here the firm) makes the offer in the renegotiation, as we must worry about the
 information transmitted by this offer. The difficulty comes from the multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria
 in the game where the firm makes an offer that the regulator accepts or rejects. However, if we used the notion
 of strong renegotiation-proofness of Maskin and Tirole (1988) (a contract is strongly renegotiation-proof if it
 is not renegotiated in any equilibrium of the renegotiation game), we would obtain the same result as here for
 this different extensive form for renegotiation.
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 The principal offers a new contract, yielding second-period costs {c, c} and rents
 { U, U} for the two types so as to solve:
 Mi{ cUu { v[(1 + A)(+(f3-c) +?c) + AU] +(1 -v)[(1 + A)(+(p3-c) + c) +A U]} (II)
 subject to
 U ' U+ ?(e) (3.1)
 U'0 (3.2)
 U'U0. (3.3)
 The levels of rent committed to, U0 and U0 = 0, are renegotiation-proof if the solution
 to (II) involves U = U0 and UC = U. One can always choose to realize these levels of
 rent by the allocations which are the solutions to programme (II) and appropriate transfers.
 Note that programme (II) includes only the good type's IC constraint (3.1). As is
 usual, the ignored IC constraint for the bad type ( U ' U - ?(Dc)) is checked ex post. The
 only difference between programmes (I) (II) is the presence of the extra IR constraint
 (3.3). That is, the good type may have been promised a higher second-period rent than
 programme (I) (see Proposition 1) would award him.
 The solution to (II) clearly involves U =0 (no new rent for the bad type) and
 c = 8 - e* (the good type's cost is socially optimal). Let us consequently simplify the
 optimization programme to:
 Minf,,,} {P[(1 +A)(q,(e*)+,8 -e*)+AkU]+(1-)[(1 +A)(q4p-c)+ c)]} (III)
 subject to
 U_ ?(DC) (yl) (3*4)
 U U0 (v2). (3.5)
 Three cases can be distinguished according to which constraints are binding in
 programme (III). The Lagrangian of this convex programme reduces to:
 L= PAU+(1-v)(1 + AMOU-0)+ e)- 1( -?(c))- Y2W - ) (3.6)
 with first-order conditions:
 CO3- ) = 1 + Yi ?D'(c) (3Y7)
 (1 - z')(1+Ak)(37
 Y1 + Y2=vA with y '0, Y2 0- (3.8)
 Case 1 occurs when U0 is small so that (3.5) is not binding (Y2 = 0). From (3.7), (3.8)
 j'X-) = 1 + V +A?(c). (3.9)
 We obtain the same result as in Proposition 1. The solutions to (I) and (III) coincide
 except that v' is replaced by v= V2. The allocation is optimal for the principal condi-
 tionally on his posterior beliefs. The contract is called conditionally optimal. From
 Proposition 1, U = qi(#3- c) - qi(I8 - c) = 4(j(p)). This case is therefore valid for U?'
 4(Dz(v)). Actually, for the first-period contract to be renegotiation-proof we must have
 U0 = (c( v)).
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 Case 2 occurs when U? is increased just beyond 0(j(z)). Then, both constraints
 are binding. So, U = U0 and c is defined by V = ?(c). This case ceases to be valid when
 U0 is so large that the incentive constraint (3.4) ceases to be binding, implying Yi = 0;
 q - L)= 1 or c-=13 -e*, the socially optimal level. Case 2 occurs for U0 between
 (W(p)) and _(p-e*) giving a cost c between 1-e* and c(v). A contract specifying
 {c = 8 - e*; 1 - e*-c- v(p); U = ?(c)} is called rent-constrained and is renegotiation-
 proof for U0 = U. The principal would wish to lower the good type's rent, but cannot
 do so because of the existence of the initial contract. This loss in rent is partially
 compensated by the fact that the cost of the bad type can be brought closer to the efficient
 level while still satisfying the good type's incentive constraint. Clearly, in the second
 period, the principal would prefer a lower value of U0 yielding a conditionally optimal
 contract. However, this does not mean that the principal is better off committing to the
 conditionally optimal contract, because the value of U0 affects the first period's incentive
 constraint.
 Finally, Case 3 occurs when U0 lies between 'D(I8 - e*) and 'D(13 - e*),8 (3.5) is
 binding and (3.4) is not. As observed above, the solution is such that c =83 - e*. So the
 two cost levels are socially optimal. The cost allocation is identical to that under a sell-out
 or fixed-price contract, in which the agent is the residual claimant for his cost savings
 (in the procurement terminology, a fixed-price contract is a contract in which the firm is
 residual claimant for its cost savings, and thus, in our context, chooses effort e*). It is
 renegotiation-proof if it corresponds to the rent U0 for the good type. Note that all
 sell-out contracts have the same efficiency E3 (1 + A )(q,(e*) + , - e*). They differ only by
 the good type's rent. Therefore, from a second-period view point, the principal prefers
 the one with the lowest rent.
 For further reference we gather our analysis in a proposition and four corollaries.
 Proposition 2. Normalizing U = 0, renegotiation-proof contracts that keep both types
 in period two can be indexed by a single parameter, the good type's rent U, with U E [ (D( z')),
 F(D8 - e*)]
 1. For U = 0(j(z)), it is the conditionally optimal contract:
 c =,B-e*; c = (v).
 2. For 4(D(v)) < U<4(D e*), it is a rent-constrained contract:
 c =8-e*; ,3 e* = (U)=D(v).
 3. For D(f - e*)= U-< (/3 - e*), it is a sell-out contract:
 c=13-e*; j=p-e*.
 Corollary 1. In a renegotiation-proof contract, the good type's rent is at least as large
 as that in a conditionally optimal contract: U ' ? U( v (j(v)).
 Corollary 2. The principal's second-period welfare is strictly and continuously decreas-
 ing with the (good type's) rent U which indexes the set of renegotiation-proof contracts. The
 efficiency of the allocation increases with the rent on [4(j(p)), 4(/3 - e*)] (rent-constrained
 contracts) and does not depend on the rent on [F(D3 - e*), 4(D3 - e*)] (sell-out contracts).
 8. Giving up a rent higher than t(,3 - e*) to the good type is impossible because this would violate the
 bad type's IC constraint.
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 Corollary 3. Consider a rent-constrained contract indexed by U which is renegotiation-
 prooffor beliefs v. Then, it remains renegotiation-prooffor beliefs v'> v.
 Proof From Proposition 2, F'( U) c(v). From Proposition 1, del/dv '0 . There-
 fore, we still have ,3-e* '(U)c'(v').
 Finally, Corollary 2 implies:
 Corollary 4. For any renegotiation-proof contract that is not conditionally optimal,
 there exists an arbitrary close renegotiation-proof contract with a (slightly) lower rent for
 the good type, and a (slightly) higher welfare for the principal in period 2.
 4. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT.
 In this section, we partially characterize the optimal contract. Section 5 completes the
 characterization.
 Theorem 1. The principal offers the agent a choice between two contracts in the first
 period. The first is picked by the good type only and yields the efficient cost in both periods.
 In the second contract, both types produce at the same cost level in the first period, and the
 second-period allocation is the conditionally optimal one given posterior beliefs V2 in [0, vj.
 To prove Theorem 1, we first show that the relevant IC constraint in the first period
 is the good type's.
 Lemma 1. Without loss of welfare, the principal can offer the agent a choice between
 two contracts, one chosen by the good type, and the other chosen by the bad type and possibly
 by the good type.
 Proof See Appendix 2. II
 The ability to commit, despite the renegotiation-proofness condition, enables the
 principal to neglect the bad type's incentive constraint. The no-commitment analysis
 provides the intuition for this result. As noted in the introduction, under no-commitment,
 the bad type's incentive constraint may be binding: the good type must be given a high
 transfer to reveal information (produce at a low cost) in the first period, which may
 induce the bad type to mimic the good type in period one and quit the relationship in
 period two. This take-the-money-and-run strategy can be prevented under commitment
 and renegotiation, as the agent can commit to produce in period two if he produces at
 a low cost in period one. Indeed, we will later show that the agent is required to duplicate
 a low first-period cost in period two.
 Interestingly, Lemma 1 and the subsequent analysis still hold when only the principal
 can commit intertemporally. As is easily seen, the principal can delay transfers so as to
 ensure that the agent's second-period utility level is non-negative whenever the agent is
 active.
 Lemma 1 implies that the overall optimal contract can be described as in Figure 1,
 where the indices of the branches (a1, a2, ... ) refer to the costs requested in the associated
 contracts.
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 Period 1 Penod 2
 Type 3 (probab. xvI)
 b,'
 Type 5 (probab. (1 -x)vI)
 beliefs a2
 V2(X)= v ( -x)
 Type ,B (probab. 1 - v1)
 FIGURE 1
 The top branch in Figure 1 represents the first contract and is chosen by the good
 type with probability x. The low and middle branches in period two represent the second
 contract. The middle branch is chosen by the good type with probability 1 - x. The low
 branch is always chosen by the bad type.
 Let U2 denote the second period rent that the good type is promised if he chooses
 a, in period 1. From Corollary 2, U2 ?-D(a2)
 The second-period cost following cost b, is the socially efficient one b2=,3 - e*, as
 it has become common knowledge from the observation of the first-period cost bi that
 the agent has type 13.
 The good type must be given a rent in the first contract that is sufficient to induce
 him not to choose the second contract. The best way to do this is to ask him to produce
 efficiently, b, = ,3 - e*, and to promise him a total rent:
 U = D(ai) +8U2. (4.1)
 It remains to determine the optimal pooling cost a,, the bad type's second period
 cost a2 and the optimal x. The determination of the probability x that the good type
 reveals his type (separates) is tackled in Section 5. For a given x, the principal's welfare
 is obtained by solving:
 Min{ai,a2,u2} {(1 +A)[vIx(f(e*)+ 13-e*)+ v(I -x)(f(A3 -aI)+aI)+(1 -p)
 x [((f3 - a,)] + a,)] + Av1'F(al)
 + 8[(1 +Ak)[ vP (i f(e*) + A - e*) + (I - vp) ( f(3-a2) + a2)] + A V1I 2]} (4.2)
 subject to the incentive and renegotiation-proofness conditions:
 U24-(a2) (4.3)
 /3 - e* -_-- a2 '_ E(P2) (4.4)
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 We first note that (4.3) is binding:
 Lemma 2. U2=D(a2).
 Proof The second-period contract must be a rent-constrained contract (including
 the two extremes in this class). For, if the second-period contract were a sell-out one
 with rent exceeding F(D3 - e*), the principal could specify a slightly lower rent for the
 good type while keeping efficiency constant and thus increase welfare (see Corollary 1). 11
 The intuition for the result that second-period contracts are rent-constrained is that
 any increase of the rent beyond D(a2) serves no purpose in period two and moreover
 requires (because the incentive constraint of the good type is binding) a further increase
 of the rent of the good type when he reveals his type.
 The optimization programme (4.2) can be broken down in two separate optimizations,
 minimization of first-period costs with respect to a1, and minimization of second-period
 costs with respect to a2 subject to (4.3) and (4.4).
 To complete the proof of Theorem 1 we consider the second minimization which is
 rewritten:
 Min{a2} {(1 + A)(1 - vP)(qi(f - a2) + a2) + Akv1((a2)} (4.5)
 subject to
 ,83 - e* -=< a2 P cv2). (4.6)
 Lemma 3. The optimal a2 equals J((V2).
 Proof Consider first the unconstrained minimization. From the Bayesian revision
 of expectations, v2 < v. The problem is therefore analogous to a one-period static problem
 with the prior v2. So the optimal solution of the unconstrained problem Z(F"1) is no
 smaller than c(v2) (from the first-order condition). As the objective function (4.5) is
 strictly convex in a2, the optimal solution of the constrained problem is j(v2). 11
 From Lemma 3, we know that the second-period contract is conditionally optimal
 given i'2.
 Minimization of (4.2) with respect to a1 yields:
 (1 -PI) (#- al) + (1 - x) PI f'(P - al)
 (I1- PJ+(l -X)PI
 A P'I
 =1- . [ f(-a1)- '(83-a1)]. (4.7)
 1+A 1-v1x
 Indeed, the optimization problem is here identical to that determining the optimal
 pooling contract (see (2.9)), but for the fact that only a fraction (1 - x) of the good types
 produce at cost a1. The two programmes coincide when x = 0. When x = 1, (4.2) coincides
 with the commitment (separating) programme (program I). Letting a1 = c1(x) denote the
 solution of (4.7), we obtain immediately:
 Theorem 2. The first-period cost in the pooling branch cl(x) is independent of the
 discount factor (for a given x), and is an increasing function of the probability x that the
 good type separates in the first period. In a pooling equilibrium (x = 0), cl(0) = cP(vP), and
 in a separating equilibrium (x = 1), c1(1) = J(PI).
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 Period 1 Pcnod 2
 Type f (pnrbab. xvI)
 Type f (probab. (1 -x)v1)
 beliefs
 C 2 = C(v2(x))
 V2(X) =Vj( -x)
 Type 5 (probab. 1 - v)
 FIGURE 2
 Theorems 1 and 2 reduce the computation of the optimal contract to the choice of
 a single number x in [0, 1] and are summarized in Figure 2.
 Remark 1. We observe that the rent given to the good type in the case of commitment
 and renegotiation is strictly higher than that in the case of commitment (i.e. D(c1(x)) +
 86'(c(v2))> >(c(vD)) + 8(c( v1)). This results from the fact that D(c1(x)) -'- (c((vj))
 (since c1(x)_c(v1)) and ?(D-(V2))> (D-(v1)) (since v2< v1j=(v2)<c(vj)). (The last
 inequality is strict because of Theorem 3 below).
 Remark 2. The principal's behaviour is equivalent to the offering of a choice between
 a long-term and a short-term contract. The acceptance of the short-term contract (to
 produce at the cost target c1(x) in the first period) is followed by the second-period
 conditionally optimal contract. As we will see in Section 6, the main difference with the
 no-commitment case is the possibility for the principal to sign a long-term contract with
 the good type to which the bad type would be committed if he were to sign it.
 5. HOW MUCH POOLING?
 This section completes the derivation of the optimal contract by determining the probabil-
 ity x that the good type separates in the first period as a function of the discount factor.
 The principal's optimization programme over x may not be concave, as we have little
 information about the curvature of the functions cl(x) and c2(x) e(V2(x)). If the solution
 is not unique, the following properties hold for any optimizing value. For notational
 simplicity, we will write x(8) as if it were unique. So for instance, "x(8) is non-increasing
 with 8" means "if x an optimum for 8 and x is an optimum for 8 > 8, then x ' x".
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 Theorem 3
 (i) The good type's probability of separation x is non-increasing with the discount
 factor 8.
 (ii) There exists 8o> 0 such that for all 8 c 80, the optimal contract is a separating
 one (x= 1).
 (iii) When 8 becomes large (8 -* oo), the optimal contract tends towards a pooling
 contract (x -* 0). However, a pooling contract is never optimal (x > 0 for all 8).
 Thus, when the discount factor increases, the optimal allocation moves from full
 revelation to full pooling. While full separation is optimal for small discount factors,
 full pooling is optimal only in the limit of large discount factors. Recall that large discount
 factors (above 1) need not be absurd, as the discount factor reflects the relative lengths
 of the accounting periods (or the relative importance of the first- and second-period
 projects).
 Proof of Theorem 3. (i) Let W(x, 8, cl, c2) denote the principal's welfare, where cl
 denotes the first-period cost in the pooling branch, and c2 the second-period cost of the
 bad type. At the optimum, cl and c2 are functions of x, but not of 8: Theorem 1 implies
 that c2 = c2(x) P(v2(x)), and Theorem 2 yields cl = cl(x). One has:
 W(x, 8, cl, c2)= G(x, c1) +8H(c2), (5.1)
 where
 G(x, cl) -S-(1 +Ak)[ vIx(qi(e*) +,8 - e*) + vI(I -x)(qi(3 - cl) + cl)
 + (1 - v(ir(- C) + cl)] -AV1P(c1) (5.2)
 is the "first-period welfare," and
 H(C2) =S-( + Ak)[ vI(q(e*) + ,-e*)+ (1-vl)(O(#-C2)+ C2)]-1 I z(C2) (5.3)
 is the "second-period welfare."
 Consider two discount factors 8 < 8 and let {x, cl = cI(x), c2 = c2(x)} and {, =cl(),
 C2= c2(x)} denote associated optimal allocations. Because renegotiation-proofness
 depends only on the separating probability and the second-period cost, and not on the
 discount factor, the principal could have chosen the allocation {I -, I} when facing
 discount factor 8. Hence:
 W(x 5, cl, C2)- W(x ,c,c) (5.4)
 Similarly,
 W(x 5, cl iC , >) W(x 5, cl, iC2). (5.5)
 Adding (5.4) and (5.5), and using (5.2) and (5.3) yields:
 (8- 8){[(1 + A)(1 - P)I(M,- c2) + c2) + Akv1((C2)]
 -[(1 +Ak)(1 - vl)(I(8-c2) + c2) +Av1F()c2)]}? 0 (5.6)
 Recall that the function [(1+Ak)(1 - v)(i(c3 - c) + c) +Av1IF(c)], which is nothing but
 the objective function under commitment, is convex in c and takes its minimum value at
 c = c(vI) by definition of c(vI). Recall further that c2 = c(v2(x)) and C2 = c(v2xA)), where
 v2(x) and v2(x) are lower than vP, implying that c2 and c2 are lower than c( vI) (Proposition
 1). Equation (5.6), together with 8> 8, implies that c2 . C2, which (again from Proposition
 1) implies that v2(x) =c v2() or x- x.
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 (ii) Let us first show that when 8 tends to 0, x(8) tends towards 1. If it does not,
 there exists a subsequence of discount factors tending to 0 (and associated values of
 x(8)) such that 1 - x(8) _ a > 0. Along this subsequence, the good type produces, with
 probability a at least, at a first-period cost exceeding cP(Pj) (Theorem 2) and thus bounded
 away from p8 - e*. Thus the welfare loss relative to the commitment solution does not
 converge to 0. But choosing {x = 1, cl = J(v1), c2 = c(0) = 3 - e*} yields a welfare
 W(x, 8, Cl, c2) that converges to the welfare under commitment when 8 tends to 0 (see
 (5.1)), a contradiction.
 Second, at 8 = 0, the optimum is the static optimum and thus involves full separation
 (x = 1). Furthermore,
 d d
 -(W(x, 6, cl(x), C2(X))) | = (G(x, cl(x)))|
 dx 5{=o,x=j} dx x=1
 = vI(I + A)[(i(,13 - j(vD)) + J(v)) - (if(e*) +13 - e*)] > 0, (5.7)
 where use is made of the envelope theorem. Hence W(1, 8, cl(l), c2(1)) >
 W(x, 8, cl(x), c2(x)) for all x close to (but lower than) 1 and all 8 close to 0.
 The intuition behind this proof is that if E (=I - x) is the probability of pooling, the
 first-period loss in welfare due to pooling is proportional to B, while the second-period
 gain due to a reduction in the good type's rent is proportional to 8E.
 (iii) When 8 tends to +oo, the (normalized) welfare under pooling
 W(O , cl(0), c2(0))/(1 + 8) tends to the (normalized) welfare under commitment. So
 must the optimal (normalized) welfare. From (5.3), c2(x(8)) must converge to c2(0) =
 J(vl), which implies that v2(x(8)) converges to vl or x(8) converges to 0 (for 8 large, G
 becomes negligible relative to AH).
 Next, fix 8. Let us show that x = 0 cannot be optimal:
 d (W(x, 8, c,(x), c2(x))) (W(X, 8, cl(x), c2(x)) (5.8)d x=0 ax X=a
 using the envelope theorem: a W/lac =0 for all x; and a W/ac2 =0 for x =0, as the
 second-period cost c2(0) is the commitment one J(vj) (note that for x> 0, a W/&c2> 0:
 the principal is constrained by renegotiation proofness in his choice of c2). Hence,
 d =aG 59 - (W(x, 8, cl(x), c2(x))) - > 0. (5.9)
 dx x=O ax x=O
 Thus full pooling cannot be optimal.
 The intuition here is that at the full pooling allocation, small changes in c2 have only
 second-order effects because the second-period allocation is the commitment one. A
 small decrease in c2 allows x to become positive without violating renegotiation-proofness,
 and the first-period allocation is improved to the first order in x. 11
 We can without loss of generality assume that when the principal offers the optimal
 renegotiation-proof contract (depicted in Figure 2 for the optimal x characterized in
 Theorem 3), the good type randomizes according to probability x (i.e. the maximal
 probability that makes the optimal contract renegotiation proof). The reader may wonder
 how the principal can guarantee that the good type chooses x. Because the good type is
 indifferent between two contracts, he has no particular incentive to do so. Indeed, for
 this optimal renegotiation-proof contract, there are other continuation equilibria (the
 reader will check that any y _ x corresponds to a continuation equilibrium and does not
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 give rise to renegotiation). However we can show that the principal can obtain his maximal
 payoff without encountering this issue of multiplicity of continuation equilibria following
 the contract offer. To do so he must offer a contract that is renegotiated (the following
 argument is similar to one in Fudenberg-Tirole (1988)). Suppose that in period one the
 principal offers two contracts: a long-term contract specifying production at cost (,3 - e*)
 in each period and intertemporal transfer [(1+ 8)qi(e*) + 'F(c,(x)) + 8'F(Z(v2(x)))]; and
 a short-term contract specifying production at cost cl(x) and transfer i (,13 - c1(x)) for
 the first period (and nothing for the second period). First, note that the bad type never
 chooses the long-term contract, because he would get a strictly negative payoff (even if
 the contract were renegotiated in period two, as renegotiation never raises the bad type's
 welfare). Hence the long-term contract is chosen by the good type only, who obtains
 rent ['F(c1(x)) + 8'6(c(v2(x)))], and is not renegotiated. Let y denote the probability that
 the good type chooses the long-term contract. Second, if the agent chooses the short-term
 contract, the principal is not committed in period two and offers the optimal static contract
 for beliefs v2(Y) characterized in Proposition 1. In particular, the good type's second-
 period rent is F(D(v2(y))), so that his intertemporal rent from choosing the short term
 contract is ['F(cl(x)) + 8((v2(y)))]. We claim that in equilibrium y = x. For, suppose
 that y > x, implying v2(Y) < v2(x). From Proposition 1, c( v(y)) < c(v2(x)). Because '(D*)
 is decreasing, the good type's intertemporal rent when choosing the short-term contract
 strictly exceeds that when choosing the long-term contract. Hence y = 0, a contradiction.
 The proof that y < x is impossible is the same. We thus conclude that 1) the equilibrium
 of the overall game is unique and 2) the principal can obtain his equilibrium payoff by
 offering a (renegotiated) contract with a unique continuation equilibrium9
 Last, it is instructive to consider the case of small uncertainty (A =13 -,13 small).
 Under no-commitment (see our 1987 paper), the welfare distortion relative to commitment
 is of the first-order in AP3 (i.e. proportional to AP3) for the best pooling contract. In
 contrast, it remains finite (i.e. does not converge to 0 with AP3) for the best separating
 contract (so that full pooling always dominates full separation for AP small). Under
 commitment and renegotiation, the welfare loss relative to commitment under both the
 best full-pooling and the best full-separating contracts (as well as contracts corresponding
 to intermediate x's) turns out to be of the second order in AP3. To see this, note first that
 for x = 1 (separating contract), the allocation differs from the commitment one only with
 respect to the bad type's second-period cost, which is equal to , -e* instead of c(vI).
 So the welfare loss under the best separating equilibrium is
 Ls Wc - W(1, 5, cF( I), ,3e*) = 51[(l + Ak)(1- vj)(0(,(3- Z( vj) + c( vj)) + kvj(D(c-( vj)]
 -[(1 +Ak)(1 - vi)(i(e*) + 13 - e*)+ AV1kF((- e*)]}.
 But, from (2.8), the difference between c(vI) and (13- e*) is proportional to AP for A,3
 small. Furthermore, c( vI) minimizes the commitment cost, so that small variations around
 c(vI) have only second-order effects. Hence, LS is proportional to (A13)2.
 The proof that LP- - W(0, 8, c (vP), j(vl)) is proportional to (A13)2 as well is
 similar. It suffices to note that the best pooling contract differs from the commitment
 9. The principal can guarantee his maximal payoff through a renegotiation-proof contract without relying
 on the "right mixing" by the good type if the good type's strategy can be purified. In the spirit of Fudenberg-Tirole
 (1988) and standard purification arguments, suppose that the agent's preferences are characterized by another
 private information parameter than /8 and that this second parameter has a continuous distribution. Then under
 some weak assumptions, the principal can offer a renegotiation-proof contract such that a) the good type (,p)
 plays a pure strategy (with probability one over his second parameter) and b) the probability of the good type's
 revealing its 8 converges to x and the principal's payoff converges to that characterized in the text when the
 second private information parameter converges to a mass point.
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 allocation only with respect to the first-period cost, which is equal to cP(v,) instead of
 ,- e* for type ,3 and c(v1) for type A3'0 We conclude that the best pooling contract and
 the best separating contract involve little loss for A,3 small under commitment and
 renegotiation, contrary to the no-commitment case."
 6. CONTINUUM OF TYPES
 We now assume that the agent's type ,3 belongs to an interval [f3, f3], and is distributed
 according to the cumulative distribution function FQ ) (such that F(f3) =0, F(3) = 1)
 with continuous density f( ). We make the classic monotone hazard rate assumption:
 F(f3)/f(f3) is a non-decreasing function of /8.
 Our 1988 paper studies this continuum model under the no-commitment assumption
 (the relationship is run by two consecutive short-term contracts). A main result there is
 that separation is not feasible, let alone desirable. That is, there exists no separating
 first-period incentive scheme s1(cl) (even a suboptimal one); for any s1( * ), the equilibrium
 function cj(,8) does not fully reveal the agent's type. We investigate whether separation
 is feasible and desirable under renegotiable commitment. The answer is found in:
 Theorem 4
 (i) There exist separating (first-period) incentive schemes. The optimal contract in the
 class of separating schemes yields the commitment allocation in period 1, and the
 socially efficient cost in period 2.
 (ii) A separating contract is never optimal for the principaL
 Proof. (i) In a separating equilibrium, the agent's type is common knowledge at
 the beginning of period 2. The possibility of renegotiation implies that the agent's
 second-period effort is socially optimal: e2(6) = e*. Hence the agent's second-period rent
 U2(,3) grows one-for-one with the agent's efficiency: U2(pB) = -1 or U2(f3) - U2(B) = 8 - 8.
 Thus, fixing U2(f3)=O w.l.o.g., both the agent's effort and his rent, and therefore the
 principal's second-period welfare, are the same in all separating contracts. We call the
 second-period contract the sell-out contract.
 The principal, if constrained to choose a separating contract, thus maximizes his
 first-period welfare. But, by definition, the welfare-optimal scheme is the commitment
 scheme. The commitment scheme is computed for a continuous distribution (see Appendix
 3 or Laffont-Tirole (1986)). Under the monotone hazard rate assumption, the agent
 produces at cost c1() = c*(f3), where c*(f8) ?_ - e* (with strict inequality except at
 ,8 =,8) and c*(f8) is a strictly increasing function of 38.
 Conversely, suppose that the principal offers the following contract: "The agent can
 choose first-period cost in the interval [c*(%3), c*(f3)]. If he has produced at cost cl
 in the first period, he must produce at cost (c*-1(cl)-e*) in the second, and re-
 ceives intertemporal transfer [fr(c*-l(ci)-c1)+8(e*)+J*-l(c) '(13-c*(pG)) d,3 +
 8(,3 - c*-l(c,))]". He thus asks for the efficient effort e* in period 2. The first part of
 the transfer is the compensation for the intertemporal disutility of effort. The second
 part corresponds to the rent in the commitment contract, plus the second-period rent.
 10. The best pooling contract dominates the pooling contract specifying cl = p - e* for both types. But,
 because (Pv) - (3 - e*) is proportional to A,l for A,l small, the welfare distortion of this alternative pooling
 contract relative fo commitment is itself of the second order.
 11. The best separating contract dominates the best pooling contract for 8 small, and the converse holds
 for 8 larger (by the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3, but restricting the choice of x between two
 values; 0 and 1).
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 By construction, this contract yields the commitment welfare in the first period, and the
 sell-out welfare in the second. The agent's local incentive compatibility constraint is
 satisfied by construction; checking that the global incentive compatibility constraint holds
 as well is routine.
 (ii) The non-separation result is proved in Appendix 3. The intuition is the following.
 In the best separating equilibrium (characterized in (i)), the first-period allocation is the
 commitment one. That is, it maximizes ex ante welfare subject to the informational
 constraints. This implies that any change in the first-period allocation has second-order
 effect. In contrast, the second-period allocation is not optimal from the point of view of
 the ex ante informational structure. This implies that changes in the corresponding
 allocation have first-order effects on welfare.
 From (i), we know that the only way to change the second-period allocation is to
 create some pooling in the first period. Our proof shows that, starting from the best
 separating contract, the principal can force the less efficient types to pool in the first
 period and thus increase his intertemporal welfare. More precisely, suppose that he
 penalizes the agent heavily if the latter's cost exceeds c*(,3 - s), where e is positive and
 small, and that he keeps the same transfers for costs in [c*(p), c*(3-E)] as in the
 commitment solution. The "bad types", i.e. those in [,3- E, ,3], now pool at cost c*(l -)-
 This increases the bad types' efficiency (because cl is brought closer to its efficient level
 for those types. Recall that c*(l)> ,3 - e*), but increases all types' rent (because U1(,3) =
 -0'(, - ci(,3)) and Ul(f3) = 0). Overall, the change decreases welfare only to the third
 order in s: to the second order times the length e over which the change operates. In
 contrast, in period 2, the pooling of the bad types goes in the right direction from an ex
 ante point of view. Because the principal offers the conditionally optimal contract given
 truncated beliefs on [,l3 - , ,l3], the cost of each bad type (but type 3 - s) is raised a bit
 (in a credible way), which moves the allocation in the direction of the commitment
 solution. The welfare gain is second order in s: first order times the length e over which
 the change operates. 11
 Theorem 4 shows that commitment and renegotiation is intermediate between full-
 commitment (for which separation is optimal) and no-commitment (for which separation
 is not feasible). Here separating contracts exist, but are not optimal.
 7. APPLICATION TO INTERTEMPORAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION.
 After substitution of effort e = ,3 - c, our model is one of adverse selection with type ,
 and screening variable c. The conclusions obtained in this paper apply to alternative
 adverse selection models. An obvious candidate for this transposition is the repeated
 version of the monopoly price (or quality) discrimination paradigm. Consider the follow-
 ing static two-type model (see, e.g. Maskin-Riley (1984)). A monopolist produces a good
 at marginal cost y, and supplies an amount q to a buyer, who derives a surplus V(q, b)
 from its consumption, where Vq > 0, Vqq < 0, Vb > O, Vqb > 0, Vqqb _ 0. The taste parameter
 b is private information to the buyer and can take two values: b ("bad type" or
 "low-valuation buyer") with probability 1- PI and b ("good type" or "high-valuation
 buyer") with probability PI. Let q* and q* denote the complete information or socially
 optimal consumptions: Vq(q*, b) = Vq(q*, b) = y (with q*> q*).
 We now assume that the seller has incomplete information about b. Let ??(q)
 V(q, b) - V(q, b) with 4"> 0 and V' 0. The monopolist chooses an optimal non-linear
 price subject to the buyer's IR and IC constraints so as to maximize its profit. In a
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 single-period context, the good type's consumption is socially optimal: 4 = q* while the
 bad type's consumption q = q(vl), which is lower than q*, maximizes the social surplus
 for this type minus the good type's rent:
 q(vl) = arg maxq {(1 - Pl)( V(q, b) - yq) - vj?(q)}. (7.1)
 ((7.1) is the analogue of Programme (I) in Section 2.)
 This price discrimination model is formally identical to ours (b corresponds to minus
 13, q to minus c, etc.)12 Hence, we can apply our results to its twice-repeated version.
 Assume that the seller leases the good to the buyer in each of two periods. V(*, *) and
 y are then per-period surplus and marginal cost. (The good can either be a perishable,
 i.e. one-period lived, good with production cost y, or a good that lasts two periods and
 costs y(l +8) to produce. In the latter case, to ensure that the second-period opportunity
 cost is y, one must assume either that there exist overlapping generations of two-period
 lived consumers and that the firm can price-discriminate between generations or that a
 one-period lived version can be produced at cost y as well.) The seller offers in period
 one a long-term leasing contract, which he can offer to renegotiate in period two. The
 solution will be called the "LT contracting solution" (where LT stands for "long-term",
 and the possibility of renegotiation under LT contracting is implicit). In the optimal
 contract, the seller offers the buyer a choice between two consumption levels in period
 one: q*, which is chosen by the good type only, and is followed by the same consumption
 in period 2; and ql(x), which is chosen by the bad type and possibly by the good type
 and is given by the analogue of the maximization of (4.2) with respect to a,:
 ql(x)=arg maxq {vj(1 -x)( V(q, b) - yq)+(1 - Pl)(V(q, b) - yq) - vjD(q)}, (7.2)
 where (1 - x) is the probability that the good type pools with the bad type. This pooling
 consumption is followed by the conditionally-optimal price discrimination scheme, yield-
 ing consumptions q* and q(v2(x)) to the good and bad types (where VA2(x)
 pi(' -x)/(pi(' -x) + 1-Vp)).
 Hart and Tirole (1988) solved this model of long-term leasing with renegotiation in
 a T-period framework for the case of unit demand (q = 0 or 1).13 A main result of their
 paper is that the equilibrium LT contract is equivalent to the Coasian durable-good
 equilibrium. In Coase's durable good model, buyers have unit demands for a perfectly
 durable good. They differ in their valuations for the good. At each date t, the seller
 offers a new price Pt for the purchase of the good. Equilibrium is characterized by a
 decreasing sequence of price offers. The seller screens low-valuation buyers through their
 willingness to delay their purchase and wait for a lower price. In contrast, in Hart-Tirole,
 12. Consider the following model, which is slightly more general than the one in this paper: (After
 normalization) the principal has utility W= Y(c,,f3)+t and the,agent U=Z(c,,f3)+t. Assume that Y, - O,
 YC,B '0; Zc < 0, Z,B < 0, Zcc < 0, Z,C > 0 and Zcco ' 0. The last two inequalities ensure that ?D(c)-
 Z(c, 3) - Z(c, f3) satisfies V'<0, D" ?0. These properties are the only ones used in the paper, and the results
 carryfover to this superficially more general model.
 Now, consider the price discrimination model. The seller (principal)'s utility is W = - yq where T is
 the price, y the marginal cost of production and q the quantity; the buyer (agent)'s utility is U= V(q, b) - T.
 To see that the price discrimination model is a special case of the above model, set c -q, /3 -b, T -t,
 Y(c, /3)= ye, Z(c, ,3) V(-c, -,3). The five assumptions on V(*, ) made above translate into the five required
 assumptions on Z(*, *).
 13. The unit demand assumption simplifies matters in many respects. First, the socially optimal consump-
 tion is not type-contingent (which, for instance, implies that there exists a single sell-out contract instead of a
 continuum of them). Second, although some continuous consumption choice is introduced into the unit demand
 model by considering a probability that the buyer consumes in each period the nature of the proof has a simple
 bang-bang flavour (for instance, the critical beliefs for a socially inefficient contract to be renegotiation-proof
 in period 2 are independent of the bad type's probability of consumption, while they depend on c2 in our paper).
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 the seller offers buyers long-term leasing contracts that are renegotiated if the concerned
 buyer and the seller find it mutually advantageous to do so. Yet, the outcome in the
 rental model under commitment and renegotiation is the same as that in the sale model
 under no-commitment. One may wonder whether an analogous result holds in the
 multi-unit case. 14 Before tackling this problem, we make three remarks. First, to the best
 of our knowledge, the durable-good model has not yet been studied with multi-unit
 consumption. Second, if such an equivalence result is to hold, we must consider non-linear
 pricing in each period in the durable-good model. Third, to make things comparable,
 we assume that supplying in period 1 a good that lasts for two periods costs (1 + 8)y, i.e.
 (1 +8) as much as supplying a single-period-lived product.
 It is straightforward to show that the seller cannot obtain more in the durable-good
 model than under a LT contract. For, in the LT contract framework, the seller can offer
 the consumption pattern corresponding to the durable-good equilibrium. In period 2,
 the buyer's consumption pattern is conditionally optimal for the seller (because the
 durable-good model has no commitment, the seller optimizes in the second period), and
 is thus renegotiation-proof.15
 Conversely, the LT contract outcome can be achieved by the durable-good monopolist
 subject to the caveat described below. For a central result of our paper (transposed to
 price discrimination) is that, following the pooling consumption, the seller uses the
 conditionally optimal price discrimination (see Theorem 1). So, consider the following
 strategies in the durable-good model: "In period 1, the seller offers for sale the quantities
 q,(x), at price V(q,(x), b)(1+8), and 4*, at price V(q*,b)(1+8)-D(q,(x))-
 86((q(P2(x))) (where x is the equilibrium probability under LT contracting, and q,(x) is
 given by (7.2)). In period 2, no further offer is made if the buyer has purchased q* in
 period 1. If the buyer has bought q,(x) in period 1, the seller offers quantities (q* - q,(x)),
 at price V(q*, b)- V(q,(x), b)-D(q(P2(x))), and (q(P2(x))-q,(x)), at price
 V(q(V2(X)), b) - V(q,(x), b). The low-valuation buyer purchases q,(x) in the first period.
 The high-valuation buyer purchases q* with probability x and ql(x) with probability
 1 - x in the first period". Given the first-period sale offers, the seller's and the buyer's
 behaviour clearly forms a continuation equilibrium of the durable-good game. Further-
 more, the first-period sale offers are optimal for the seller because, from our earlier result,
 the seller's profit in the durable-good model cannot exceed that for the optimal LT contract.
 The caveat is apparent in the previous proof. For the equivalence result to hold, the
 buyer's consumption under LT contracting must be non-decreasing. This amounts to the
 condition: q1(x) ' q('2(x)). This condition holds for discount factors under some thresh-
 old level from Theorem 3.16 For instance, for small discount factors, the equilibrium is
 separating (x = 1) so that ql(x) = q(vl) < q(v2(x)) = q*. But for discount factors above
 the threshold level, ql(x) exceeds q(v2(x)), and the durable-good monopolist's profit is
 strictly lower than the profit under LT contracting (because LT contracting allows
 decreasing consumption paths).
 To summarize our study of the two-period framework, the equivalence between
 Coasian durable-good dynamics and LT contracting holds as long as the discount factor
 is lower than some threshold value, i.e. as long as the low-valuation buyer's consumption
 under long-term contracting is time-increasing. Alternatively, our work can be viewed as
 14. We are grateful to Oliver Hart for suggesting this question.
 15. This simple reasoning holds only in the two-period model. With more than two periods, a more
 elaborate argument is needed. See Hart-Tirole (1988) for the unit demand case.
 16. Theorem 3 implies that x is a non-increasing function of B. Furthermore, q(v2(x)) is increasing in x
 while q,(x) decreases with x.
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 generalizing the durable-good model to, and deriving the equilibrium for, multi-unit
 consumption.
 Theorem 5. Consider the two-period two-type price discrimination (rental) model with
 commitment and renegotiation.
 (i) In the first period the buyer chooses between consumptions q* and q,(x) where
 q* > qj(x). Consumption q*, which is chosen by the high-valuation consumer with
 probability x, is repeated in period two. With probability (1 - x), the high-demand
 consumer pools with the low-demand consumer and consumes q1(x) in period one.
 They then consume q* and q(v2(x)) respectively in period two.
 (ii) There exists a discount factor So> 0 such that the outcome in the rental model
 under commitment and renegotiation (characterized in (i)) is the same as that in
 the sale model under no-commitment if and only if 8 '
 8. COMMITMENT, RENEGOTIATION AND NO-COMMITMENT
 In Laffont-Tirole (1987, 1988), we studied the model of this paper under the assumption
 that the relationship is organised by way of a sequence of two short-run contracts (the
 no-commitment case). That is, the principal offers a first-period incentive scheme s,(c,),
 observes cl, and offers in period 2 the contract S2(C2, C1) that is conditionally optimal
 given posterior beliefs.17 We view the exploration of commitment and renegotiation and
 of no-commitment as complementary. The first refers to a complete contract situation
 and the second to a situation in which the parties cannot commit, either because of legal
 constraints (as may be the case for public procurement) or because the second-period
 contingencies are hard to foresee or costly to include in the initial contract. Alternatively,
 when complete contracts can be signed, the comparison between the two yields a measure
 of the value of commitment. Figure 3 gathers some results from the three papers and
 compares commitment, commitment and renegotiation, and no-commitment.
 Notes on Figure 3
 (a) The "randomization" can be degenerate, as in the case of full separation.
 (b) Only the weaker property that full pooling is preferred to full separation is
 proved in our 1987 paper. However, it is easily shown that the equilibrium
 allocation is essentially the one obtained under full pooling.
 (C) Ur = CF(CI(x)) + 86C(D( 2(X))) is equal to 4(D(J(P)) + SO(p - e*) >
 (1+8)4>(D(Z'))= Uc for 8 small. When 8 tends to infinity, Ur/8lA_(l(,I))=
 yC/s.
 (d) For 8 small, the no-commitment equilibrium is separating and the rent is
 Unc = 4(D(z,I)) + SO( - e*) = Ur.
 (e) In general, WfC ' wr, because under commitment and renegotiation, the prin-
 cipal can always offer a short-term contract in the first-period and thus duplicate
 the no-commitment solution. The two welfares coincide only when the bad type's
 IC constraint is not binding in the no-commitment case, i.e. when 8 is small.
 See also the comments below.
 (f) "Full separation" means that the principal learns the agent's type at the end of
 the first period. "Feasibility" refers to the existence of a (not necessarily optimal)
 contract that separates the types. "Desirability" refers to the optimal contract.
 17. Baron and Besanko (1987) study a different form of limited commitment. The firm promises to
 produce in period 2 and the principal commits to use in period 2 a mechanism which is "fair", i.e. which leaves
 to the firm non-negative profits given the information transmitted in period 1.
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 Nature of
 commitment Full Commitment No
 Nature of commitment and renegotiation commitment
 equilibrium (c) (r) (nc)
 Two types
 Binding IC constraint Good type's Good type's Good type's, bad
 in first period type's, or both
 First period Full separation Randomizationa by Randomizationa by one
 revelation good type or the two types
 Equilibrium for Full separation Full separation Full separation
 small 8
 Equilibrium for Full separation Tends to full pooling Tends to full poolingb
 large 8
 Second-period No Yes Yes
 contract
 conditionally optimal?
 Good type's rent uc Ur> Uc UnC= Ur> uc
 (Uc, r Ujnc) (Vr- Uc)/6_>O U"c UC in generald
 as +oc
 Principal's expected WC Wr < Wc = Wr for 8 small
 welfare WnC< Wr otherwisee
 (WC, wrI Wnc)
 Continuum of types
 Full separation feasible ?f Yes Yesg No
 Full separation desirable ?f Yes No No ("much pooling")
 FIGURE 3
 (g) The principal can fully separate the types by offering a sell-out contract from
 date 1 on (i.e. offering si(c)=s2(c)=(qi(e*)+f3 e*)-c, where , is the upper
 bound of the interval of types.
 The renegotiation case technically resembles the commitment case in that the IC
 constraints are well-behaved: only the good type's IC constraint is binding. In contrast,
 under no-commitment, the good type must receive a high first-period reward to reveal
 his information, because ratcheting makes such revelation costly to him. The bad type
 may then be tempted to "take-the-money-and-run", i.e. to mimic the good type in the
 first period, get the high reward and refuse to produce in the second period (this strategy
 is particularly tempting if 8 is high, because the good type values the future much and
 therefore must be bribed more to reveal his type). This possibility makes the bad type's
 IC constraint binding if the discount factor is not too small. The take-the-money-and-run
 strategy can be prevented under commitment (even with renegotiation) by forcing the
 agent to repeat his first-period performance if the latter was excellent (i.e. equal to ,3 - e*).
 In both the renegotiation and no-commitment cases, the first-period contract involves
 pooling if the discount factor is not too small. Furthermore, the second-period contract
 is conditionally optimal. In a sense, the main difference between these two cases is the
 possibility for the principal under commitment and renegotiation to prevent the take-the-
 money-and-run strategy. This power allows him to give the good type more incentives
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 to separate without having the bad type mimic the good type in the first period. Because
 the take-the-money-and-run strategy is not optimal for the bad type for small discount
 factors, it is not surprising that the renegotiation and no-commitment solutions coincide
 for small discount factors.
 An apparent lesson of our three papers and of Figure 3 is that the renegotiation case
 is somewhat intermediate between the commitment and no-commitment paradigms.
 APPENDIX 1
 Optimal Scheme under (Full) Commitment
 The optimal static commitment solution is characterized in Proposition 1. Suppose that the principal can
 commit over two periods. A two-period mechanism is a pair of cost-transfer vectors
 Ml: (c9, s~,) (El, s,)
 in period 1, and a similar pair in period 2
 M2: (C92, s20, (U2, s?2)-
 Expected social welfare is:
 W*= v,[S-(1+Ak)(cg,+s,)+s,-0(,8 -c,)] +I v,6S-l+ A)(c92+S2)+S2-41(J8 -c2)]
 +(-v1)[S-(l+A)(c,+s,)+s,1-q,(p-C1)]?(1 - v)[S-(1+A)(c2+&2)+.s2-q,(p3-Q)]. (A.1)
 Let M: (c, s) , () denote the optimal static mechanism (M turns out to be deterministic under our
 assumptions, but the following reasoning carries over to optimal static mechanisms that are stochastic). The
 associated one-period welfare is:
 W vl[S-(1 + A)(c+ s)+ s -i,(p -c)]+ (1 -l)[S-(1 + A)(c+ s)+ s- (# -c)].
 Note that M repeated twice is an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that yields welfare
 (1 + 8) W in the two-period model. Suppose that W* > (1 + 8) W, and consider the following static stochastic
 mechanism: M-Ml with probability 1/(1 + 8) and M2 with probability 8/(1 + 8) (so, for instance, when
 announcing ,3, the firm is instructed to produce at cost cl and receives transfer sl, with probability 1/(1 + 8),
 and is instructed to produce at cost c2 and receives transfer ?52, with probability 8/(1 + 8)). Mechanism M is
 incentive compatible and individually rational (because (Ml, M2) is in the dynamic context) and yields expected
 welfare W*/(1 + 8) > W, which contradicts the optimality of M in the static context.
 APPENDIX 2
 Proof of Lemma 1
 We assume that the principal offers two contracts A and B in the first period (see footnote 6). We shall later
 show that the use of more than two contracts does not increase the principal's welfare. The bad type's
 intertemporal utility may be set equal to zero (if it were equal to a strictly positive number, the principal could
 uniformly reduce all rents by this number and reach a higher welfare without perturbing any of the IR, IC and
 RP constraints). Furthermore we can choose the intertemporal structure of transfers to put the bad type's utility
 equal to zero in each period.
 Let a, and b, denote the first-period costs in these two contracts, and a2 and b2 the corresponding bad
 type's second-period costs (Proposition 2 implies that the good type's second-period cost in both contracts is
 /3 - e*). Let A, and A2, and B1 and B2 denote the good type's first- and second-period rents (i.e. the utility
 levels since the IR levels are normalized at zero) in contracts A and B.
 Let x (respectively 1 - x) denote the probability that the good type chooses contract B (respectively A).
 Similarly y is the probability that the bad type chooses contract A. We assume that 1 > x, y > 0, so that we
 have "double randomization".18 Our goal is to show that the principal can do as well with randomization by
 18. We assume that the principal keeps both types in both contracts. As noted in the text, if the principal
 kept only the good type in period two in contract B, the contract B second-period cost would be the socially
 optimal one for the good type. The following proof shows that the principal is better off if the bad type ceases
 to randomize and chooses contract A with probability one (i.e., produces with probability one in period two).
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 one type only or no type at all. The good type randomizes between the two contracts only if he obtains the
 same intertemporal rent in both:
 Al + 8A2 = B1+ 8B2- (A.2)
 (A.2) will be called the (first-period) incentive compatibility constraint.
 Last let Y2 denote the posterior probability that the agent has type / given that first-period cost was b,
 (i.e. contract B was chosen). Similarly 92 is the posterior probability following cost a,.
 Figure 4 summarizes the situation.
 From our normalization (the rent of the bad type is zero in each period), the rent of the good type in
 period 1 is the static rent 4(b,) for contract B and 4(a,) for contract A. So we obtain:
 Claim 1. Al = 4D(a,) and B, = D(bj).
 From Corollary 1, we know that A2? U(pu2) and B2 ?U(Y2). We next show that both second-period
 contracts are rent-constrained contracts and that one of the two is a conditionally optimal contract:
 Claim 2. (i) Either A2 = U(tA2) or B2 = U(Y2). (ii) A2 = D(a2) and B2 = 4(b2)-
 Proof. (i) Suppose that A2> U(p2) and B2> U(v2). From Corollary 4, the principal could in the first
 period offer contracts that reduce A2 and B2 slightly and increase welfare. If A2 and B2 are reduced in equal
 amounts (which is feasible because they can be lowered continuously), the IC constraint (A.2) is kept satisfied
 and the randomizing probabilities and the first-period allocations can be kept the same.
 (ii) Suppose without loss of generality that A2 = ULA92) and that B specifies a sell-out contract in period
 2. From Proposition 2, the sell-out contract is renegotiation-proof for any posterior Y2. This implies that we
 can change the probabilities x and y without perturbing the renegotiation-proofness of contract B.
 Period 1 Period 2
 Branch B
 Posterior beliefs j Type p (probab. vlx)
 Y2= v1x +(1-v0)(1-y)
 Contract B.
 Rent:
 B I + SB2-
 b X \ b2
 { Branch Bl
 Type 5 (probab. (1 -vI)(l -y))
 Branch -
 \ Type (probab. v1(0 -x))
 Contract A.
 Rent:
 Posterior beliefs a2 AI + 4A2
 vi(l - x)\
 >2Vi(I - X) + (0 - VO)Y\
 BranchA
 Type 5 (probab. (1 -v1)y)
 FIGURE 4
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 Corollary 3 implies that renegotiation-proofness of contract A is preserved if the new probabilities x and
 are chosen so that the induced posterior /22 is at least as large as ,u2, i.e.
 vl(1 -x-)+( - v1 y2 (A.3)
 or
 PI (1 - u2) (1 - x) _(1 - PO)1A2Y (A.4)
 The principal's welfare W(x, y) is linear in x and y, keeping contracts (i.e. a,, a2, b, and b2) constant.
 Its maximization with respect to ,y under (A.4) and 0 'x _1 and 0 -' ' 1 yields corner solutions. Con-
 sequently, at least one of the x and y is 0 or 1 and the maximum of the principal's welfare can be reached
 without double randomization by the agent, a contradiction. 11
 Claim 2 implies that (A.2) can be written in the following way:
 F(a1) + 8F>(a2)= F)(bl) + 8)(b2). (A.5)
 Let us assume w.l.o.g. that al-?bl. Then F(al)'F(bl) and therefore a2'b2 from (A.5).
 Claim 3. cp ( Y2) _ cp (L2)
 Proof. From (2.10), this amounts to showing that Y2 I /2. From Claim 2, we have two cases to consider.
 Case a: a2= =(/L2) and b2 ?-( Y2)-
 The inequality a2 b2 implies that 0(/L2) c-(Y2), which from Proposition 1, yields /L2 - Y2
 Case b: b2 = Y(Y2) and a2 < c(/L2).
 From the strict concavity of the objective function in the commitment case, raising a2 slightly strictly
 increases welfare. But to keep (A.5) satisfied, a, must be reduced slightly. This also increases welfare (or has
 a second-order effect) if al _ cCP(,2). Hence we have a, <CP(A2).
 Next, because b2 is conditionally optimal, a small reduction in b2 has only a second-order effect on
 second-period welfare, and, from Proposition 2, preserves renegotiation-proofness of contract B. So it must
 be the case that a slight increase in b, (so as to keep (A.5) satisfied) does not raise first period welfare. Hence
 bl '?cP(y2). But since al '-bl, Cp(G2) > Cp(Y2) andA2 < Y2 *
 We are led to consider two cases through the next result.
 Claim 4. Either
 cP(y2)_ b1? a, _ cP(A2). (Case 1)
 Or
 b1 < cP(y2) _ cPQ(2) < a. (Case 2)
 Proof. Suppose firstthat bl _ cCP(Y2) _ al _ cp (2) with either bI < cp (y2) or a1 < cp( t2) (orboth). Raising
 slightly a1 and b, so as to keep [ID(bl) - 4(al)] constant (and thus (A.5) satisfied) raises the principal's welfare
 to the first order by bringing the first-period costs towards the optimal pooling cost corresponding to the mix
 of types associated with each contract. (This again results from the strict concavity of the pooling objective
 function. When b, = cP(y2), say, a slight increase in b, has only second-order effects on the principal's welfare).
 The proof is identical when cp(y2) _ b-' cP(A2) ' a1, with either cp(y2) < b, or cp(,u2) < a (or both). It then
 suffices to reduce b, and a1 slightly keeping (A.5) satisfied. 11
 We consider the two cases defined in Claim 4 sequentially:
 Case 1. Let us show that a slight increase in x raises welfare. An increase in x amounts to a displacement
 of the "good type population" from branch A to branch B. The good type's rent is unaffected; so is the
 second-period efficiency (because the good type produces at 8 - e* in both cases). The first-period efficiency
 strictly increases if b, < a,. [The case b, = a, is uninteresting as (A.5) then implies b2= a2, and thus the two
 contracts are identical and can be merged. Renegotiation proofness is preserved in the merger because the new
 posterior beliefs, equal to PI, are a convex combination of /12 and Y2, because of the fact that E(Pv) ' E(Y2)
 and because of Corollary 3.] For, from (2-10),
 ,8f-e*<cP(y2) -b<a,.
 By strict concavity of the objective function under commitment, a reduction in the good type's cost above
 f3 - e* raises welfare.
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 The next question is whether the increase in x maintains renegotiation-proofness. It clearly does for
 contract B from Corollary 3. It also does for contract A unless A2 = U(it2) (also from Corollary 3). So assume
 that A2 = U(,t2). A small increase in x requires a slight upward adjustment in A2 (i.e. a slight downward
 adjustment in a2) to preserve renegotiation-proofness. But this increase in A2 has only a second-order welfare
 effect, because the initial contract is conditionally optimal. Next, this decrease in a2 requires a small increase
 in a, to keep (A.5) satisfied. But a, _ cCP(,2) implies that an increase in a, raises first-period welfare (or does
 not affect it to the first-order).
 So we conclude that a slight increase in x, together with small changes in a, and a2 so as to keep (RP)
 and (A.5) satisfied, strictly increases welfare, a contradiction.
 Case 2. First suppose that B2 = U(Y2). Then any small reduction in b2 has a second-order effect on
 welfare and preserves renegotiation-proofness by Proposition 2. A small increase in b, to keep (A.5) satisfied
 strictly increases welfare because b, < cP(y2). Hence B2 > U(Y2) (and therefore A2 = VGL2)).
 Keeping everything else (costs) constant, let W(x, y) denote the principal's welfare when the randomizing
 probabilities are x and y. W is linear in x and 9. From Corollary 3, any (x, 9) satisfying
 V(10 - ,A2)(1 - x)l _ ,A2( - PX)y (A.6)
 yields posterior beliefs /L2: ? /2 in contract A and thus preserves renegotiation-proofness in this contract. In
 the (x, y) space, the solution of the maximization of the linear objective function W over the half-space defined
 by (A.6) and over the constraints that and 9 belong to [0, 1] and that B2 ? U(Y2(-, 9)) (renegotiation-proofness
 on contract B) is a corner solution. Either B2 = U(Y2(-, 9)) and our previous condition is violated, or x or 9
 (or both) is equal to 0 or 1, and the double randomization assumption is violated.
 We thus conclude that in both cases, maximal welfare can be reached without double randomization.
 That is, there exists a renegotiation-proof contract that yields the same intertemporal rent to the good type,
 and at least as much welfare to the principal, and that involves randomization by at most a single type. Note
 in passing that this shows also that there is no point considering more than two contracts. With more than two
 contracts, one can apply the above reasoning to any pair of pooling contracts. Because it is possible to keep
 the agent's rent constant in the inductive reduction process, this shows that there is at most one pooling contract.
 The next step in the proof of Lemma 1 consists in showing that randomization by the bad type only
 cannot be optimal for the principal. Suppose that x = 1 (the case x = 0 is treated identically). Then a2 = p - e*
 because, following a,, it is common knowledge that the agent's type is 13.
 Suppose first that
 Al+8A2<B1+8B2. (A.7)
 Then a, = # - e*, moving a, towards p - e* raises efficiency and affects neither the incentive constraint (A.7)
 nor the good type's rent. Because branch A is efficient (the bad type produces at the efficient cost in each
 period), an increase in y raises efficiency and preserves renegotiation proofness of contract B by raising Y2
 (from Corollary 3). Thus there exists a dominating separating equilibrium (with y = 1).
 Second, suppose that
 Al+8A2= B1+8B2. (A.8)
 Let W(y) denote the principal's welfare when y varies, everything else being kept constant. It is linear in y.
 If WY - 0, one can increase y without reducing welfare, and keep renegotiation-proofness in contract B. If
 WY <0, a slight decrease in y strictly raises welfare. However, it lowers Y2, and to preserve renegotiation
 proofness in contract B, the principal must increase B2 (i.e. lower b2) slightly. Because the second-period
 contract following b, is conditionally optimal, this adjustment has only a second-order effect on the principal's
 welfare. Hence the upper bound cannot be reached by having only the bad types randomize, which completes
 the proof of Lemma 1. ||
 APPENDIX 3
 Proof of Theorem 4-Separation is Not Optimal with a Continuum of Types
 The optimal static mechanism is the solution of:
 Max [S - (1 + A)(,8 - e( p)) -A U( p)]dF( p) (IV)
 U(13) = -Y'(e(13)) a.e. (A.9)
 U(p) _0 (A.10)
 (A.11)
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 (A.9) is a rewriting of the incentive constraint. Indeed, faced with a revelation mechanism, the agent
 maximizes
 s(1) - qlc( - c(p))
 with respect to its announcement 13, leading to the first-order incentive constraint (see Guesnerie and Laffont
 (1984) for details):
 s(,0) - 4'(,P - 4OW(,8))c8) = O (A.12)
 and the necessary and sufficient second-order condition
 c(,8) _ O X e(,(3) _ 1. ~~~~~~(A. 13)
 Defining U(,8) as firm 8's rent when it tells the truth, i.e. U(,3) = s(,83) - i(j3 - c(,3)) and using (A.12)
 U1(,(3) = -ir'(, - c(,3)) --Y'(e(,3)) < 0. (A.14)
 The individual rationality constraint
 U(p)?O VpE[,p,]
 can be, in view of (A.14) simplified into (A.10).
 Ignoring (A.11), the Hamiltonian of problem (IV) is
 H = [S-(1 + A)(,3 - e(,3)) -AkU(3)]f(,(3)-/L(13)f'(e(13)),
 where pL(j8) is the multiplier associated with (A.9). The Pontryagin principle yields:
 aH
 4(13) = Af-= (13). au
 Using the transversality condition ,u (,8) = 0, we get IL (,8) = AF(,3).
 Maximizing H with respect to the control e gives
 1Y(e*(p8)) = 1- -F(1) a1,t(e*(p)). (A.15)
 1 +A f(f3)
 Differentiating (A.14) we see that, under our monotone hazard rate assumption ((F/f) non-decreasing)
 and f"'- 0, e _ 0. Therefore, the second-order condition (A.1 1) is satisfied and (A.15) with U(13) = 0 character-
 izes the optimal solution.
 The rent of firm 18 is (integrating (A.14)):
 U(IO) J Y(e*(x))dx.
 Replacing e*(,) by 18- c*(8) in (A.15) and differentiating yields:
 A frt(e*(P)) d (,
 dc* +AA(p8) = I + A A f /t ) (A. 16)
 d,0 4Y'(*(,0)) +A F(f3) q1...(e*(p))
 1 +A f(f)
 Now consider the small change described in the text, i.e. the types in [13- , 13] pool at cost c*(f3 e) in
 the first period. Following c*(,8 - e), the principal offers the commitment contract for the truncated distribution
 (F(f ) - F(f - 6))/(1 - F( 3- e)) for 1? _f- e. It is straightforward to check that the new allocation is incentive
 compatible (this is due to the fact that the first- and second-period efforts of type 8 - E are unchanged and
 that, by concavity of the agent's utility function, the types in [,1, 1 - e] would pool with type E - E if they were
 forced to pool with a type in [13 - , p3]. The change in first-period welfare A WI is given by
 i\ WI--GI-LI, (A. 1 7)
 where GI is the gain in efficiency and LI the loss due to the increase in the agent's rent. We have:
 G f (1 +Ak)[ 4i(8 - c*(p)) + c*() - 4(, -cc*( -))- c*(p#-)]f( p)dp
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 But, from (A.15), and F(f) = 1,
 1 - 4 - C*(-)) = If t(1())), (A.19)
 and from (A.16):
 c*0) - c*(# -e~ A( -)(, - + e). (A.20)
 Substituting (A.19) and (A.20) into (A.18) yields:
 A fp
 GI~ | I+Ak)A( )(p-,8+e) l+A f() (A.21)
 or
 2
 GI= AA(p)qY'(e*(p0)) 2 + O(63). (A.22)
 Next we compute Ll. Because of el(,8) is unchanged for ,3',1- the rent of each type 18? f3- E
 increases by the same amount as that of type 8 - E (the increase in the rents of types 18 >,8 - e is socially
 negligible (i.e. of order O(63)) relative to that of types 13 p_ 1- E, because the former types have negligible
 weight relative to the latter types for E small). The increase in the rent of type E - E is given by:
 8U(p- 6) = J [it(13 - cc*(#- E)) - c,( c*(1)))]dp
 ar"(f3- c*(p))(c*(13) - c*(3 - E))do
 qY'(-c*(p ))A(,p)(,8-,8 + E6)d,8
 2
 = A(p) c"(-c*(p)) 2 (A.23)
 But
 L= A8U(,8- E)f(,8)d 3 A8U(f3- E)
 E2
 = AA(,O)qi"( -c*(p)) 2 + L (_ )
 2
 = G + O(63). (A.24)
 As claimed in the text, we have
 A WI = O(E3). (A.25)
 Let us now consider the second period. The change in welfare is given by 8A\ W2, where
 A W2 = G2-L2, (A.26)
 G2 is the gain coming from the reduction in the agent's rent and L2 is the loss in efficiency. The computation
 of G2 is identical to that of LI, except that the effort of the high type is in the second period e*, and not e*(,3)
 like in period 1. As can easily be checked, this implies that the new A(,8), computed from the new effort e*
 and from the truncated distribution, is equal to 1. Hence:
 E2
 G2 =,AkI(e*) - + O(3). (A.27)
 2
 In contrast, L2 is of the third order in E, because the initial allocation is cost efficient. More formally:
 L2 = ( 1 + Ak)(qi(,( - c(,(3)) + c(,(3 )- q(e*) - 0 + e*)f(l3 )d,0, (A.28)
 where c(,8) is the commitment solution for the truncated distribution:
 A F(3) -F(f-) - E (1c(p))(
 f() -40).(A.29)
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 Note that for E small,
 r(f3 - c(/3)) - I(e*) = (/3 - c-(/3) - e*) + !af"(e*)(,p - c(/3) - e*)2+ O(E3) (A.30)
 using ql'(e*) = 1. Hence, (A.28) can be rewritten as:
 L2= (1 A) qi"(e*)(Po-c(0) - e*)2f(,8)d,8. (A.3 1)
 But, from (A.30) and 1 = qi'(e*):
 A
 /3-(/3 )-e* - 1- + e). (A.32)
 1 +A
 (A.31) and (A.32) yield:
 L k 2 4111 A)+(*)f(/3)_3 =0(__3).
 6(1 + A)
 We thus conclude that
 AWI+8AW2 8G2>0- 11
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